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Catholics and Protestants differ in terms of social autonomy versus heteronomy. We propose that the regulation of
behavior in accordance with social norms depends on the social control exercised by an authority for Catholics
more than it does for Protestants. Two experiments measured cheating behavior (the transgression of a social
norm) as a function of the religious group (Protestant vs. Catholic) and social control (with vs. without). Catholics
were found to be more responsive to social control, that is, to cheat less when social control was salient, whereas
Protestants’ behavior did not depend on this dimension. In Study 2, intrinsic-extrinsic religiousness was found
to mediate this difference. Results are discussed in the context of the effects of public policies based on social
control.
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“I will put my law in their minds . . . No longer will they teach their neighbor,
or say to one another, ‘Know the Lord,’ because they will all know me,
from the least of them to the greatest,” declares the Lord.”
(Jeremiah 31:33–34 [New International Version])
INTRODUCTION
The idea of a personal and direct relationship between God and humans was so revolutionary
that it triggered not only the so-called Protestant Reformation, but was closely linked to other
major European social transformations in the 16th century. Protestantism introduced the idea
of a faith based on one’s direct affiliation with God, as opposed to Catholicism, in which the
Church mediates this connection. These two types of religious structures operate differently
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in people’s minds: Protestants tend to be more intrinsically oriented toward religion, whereas
Catholics tend to be more extrinsically oriented toward religion. In this article, we argue that
Protestants should therefore endorse more self-determined morality-related behavior, whereas
Catholics should comply more with the social norm, especially when there is some social control
(i.e., the pattern of social pressure aiming to maintain established rules) (Ogburn and Nimkoff
1940).
INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC RELIGIOUSNESS AMONG CATHOLICS AND PROTESTANTS
Deci and Ryan (1985) defined intrinsic motivation as the tendency to regulate behavior on the
basis of integrated values, and extrinsic motivation as the tendency to regulate behavior on the
basis of external constraints. Ryan, Rigby, and King (1993) have applied self-determination
theory to religion. On the one hand, individuals holding intrinsic religious orientation fully
adopt religion as their personal standards and show higher volition. On the other hand, extrinsic
religiousness relates to a partial internalization of religion as personal values that are determined
by pressure from other people (i.e., introjection). Allport (1950) already proposed a similar
distinction between those who are motivated by goals intrinsic to religious practices and beliefs
and those who are motivated by goals extrinsic to them. Allport and Ross (1967) developed a
scale assessing intrinsic and extrinsic religiousness, with Protestants reporting higher intrinsic
orientation and Catholics higher extrinsic orientation (e.g., Cohen and Hill 2007; but see Donahue
1985). Globally, studies suggest that Protestants behave in a more autonomous way and Catholics
in a more heteronomous way, thereby being more responsive to authority and control from
others.
Such differences in behavior regulation do not concern ex nihilo religious beliefs, but rely
on differences in relationship with the authority. In Catholicism, faith is organized through a
relationship of normative dependency to the group and its authorities. Socially speaking, it
corresponds to a power relationship that implies obedience to the authority (i.e., the Church)
and conformity to its norms (Christophe [1982–1983] 2000). By contrast, Protestantism might
be viewed as “a free faith,” where each believer is able to make his/her own interpretation of
biblical histories (within his/her faith tradition). Beyond the religious content itself, Protestantism
as introduced by Luther was basically a claim to give freedom of exegesis to each Christian,
as well as independency from the Church’s social hierarchy. This explains, for example, why
Catholicism had more often been in direct conflict with science than Protestantism had (Minois
1991). Historically speaking, the former more strongly asked conclusions drawn from discoveries
to conform to the Church’s positions, whereas the latter allowed its followers to investigate nature
and reality in a more independent way.
These structural differences might explain why Protestants tend to internalize social norms
and adhere to them on a more personal basis (intrinsic religiousness), whereas Catholics adhere
to norms on the basis of social control, following the authorities that set these norms (see
Cohen 2015). Other lines of research are consistent with this idea, with Catholics (but also some
fundamentalist Protestants) scoring higher than Protestants on authoritarianism (Adorno et al.
1950; Putney and Middleton 1961), dogmatism (Rokeach 1960, except for Baptists), or valuing
more obedience in children (Ellison and Sherkat 1993). It is worth noting that these findings
mostly apply to the comparisons between Catholics and Protestants from the so-called mainline
denominations (encouraging tolerance for interpersonal differences), rather than those between
Catholics and Protestants from the evangelical denominations (encouraging strict adherence
to religious doctrines) (see Steensland et al. 2000). Indeed, among evangelical denominations,
some subgroups tend to share stronger views on biblical authority, rejecting science, and being
theologically more conservative (for a review, see Woodberry and Smith 1998).
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AUTONOMOUS AND HETERONOMOUS NORM INTEGRATIONS AMONG CATHOLICS AND PROTESTANTS
Theoretical Underpinning
In the field of sociology of crime, studies have shown how conformity to the law echoes the
above concepts of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Specifically, the role of “self-control” has
been opposed to that of “social integration” as mediators of the violation of rules. Self-control
is viewed as personal self-restraint acquired through childhood socialization and maintained
thereafter as an internal control on behavior regulation (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990). Social
integration is viewed as a psychological strength that binds people to others, increasing the
conformity to group norms and reducing infringement of the law (Durkheim [1967] 1967).
Religion has been found to promote socially normative behaviors, including a lower like-
lihood of engaging in crime and delinquency (e.g., Ulmer et al. 2012). Religion is thought to
foster self-regulation via the above-mentioned mechanisms: self-control (refraining from an un-
desirable behavior as a result self-monitoring) and social control (refraining from an undesirable
behavior as a result of monitoring by the members of one’s religious community) (McCullough
and Willoughby 2009; Ulmer et al. 2012). As far as social control is concerned, God himself can
be considered as the ultimate source of surveillance, that is, “the eye in the sky” watching us. As a
matter of fact, when the concept of God is activated, believers tend to act in a more moral (Chan,
Tong, and Tan 2014), socially desirable (Gervais and Norenzayan 2012), and self-controlled way
(Rounding et al. 2012).
Participating in religious activity (e.g., attending church) can play a similar role. On the
one hand, religious activity helps people to internalize moral commitments that motivate self-
regulation of one’s own behavior (Perrin 2000). On the other hand, religious activity builds per-
sonal relationships among believers, who may exert mutual social control (Stark and Bainbridge
1996). Thus, with such religious activities, both dimensions (i.e., self- and social control) may be
active, but operate differently.
In social psychology, the study of social norms has followed similar paths, albeit focus-
ing on the nature of the norms themselves. Codol (1975) made a distinction between ideal
and factual norms.1 Norms of the first kind are followed because of the intrinsic moral value
that individuals personally attribute to them. Norms of the second kind are those that the ma-
jority follows as a matter of fact and that people agree with because of normative pressure.
Milgram’s (1974) experiments may be the most impressive set of studies showing that people
can intensively submit to an authority that exerts social control. These two types of norms can
respectively be interpreted according to an internal control (the intrinsic value granted to the
norm by the self) and an external one (the majority of the group or one of its legitimate author-
ities). Furthermore, adhering to these social norms could be nothing else than a consequence
of differences between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations: individuals might follow a norm be-
cause it has been integrated, or because the authority responsible for the norm exercises social
control.
Following these ideas, it is legitimate to think that individuals from a Protestant background—
as they tend to integrate norms in a more autonomous way—might regulate behaviors through
self-control, rather than the control of an authority. Conversely, individuals from a Catholic
background—as they tend to follow norms through a heteronomous relationship with authority—
may regulate behaviors according to social control rather than self-control. Note that we are
not arguing that faith in itself predicts different reactions to social control; beyond the religious
content itself, being socialized in a Protestant versus a Catholic family environment (without
1See also Cialdini, Reno, and Kalgreen (1990), who made an analogous but not homologous distinction between injunctive
and descriptive norms.
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even necessarily being a believer oneself) should predict different integration of authority-related
social norms.
Indirect Evidence
Three kinds of results suggest the plausibility of different norm integration between Catholics
and Protestants. A first one comes from the relationship between Christianity and voluntary
association membership. Religion is a social network that may lead people to voluntarily work to
help others. As this kind of behavior does not depend at all on an authority, one might expect that
those who internalize the religious norms will endorse them more. As a matter of fact, Catholics
were found to be less inclined to freely participate in secular associations than Protestants
(Pui-Yan 2006).
Second, results in the domain of religious schooling show that adults who attended a Catholic
school are less religious than those who attended Protestant ones; it suggests that frequenting
Catholic schools has little effect on people’s religiosity once they are no longer submitted to the
religious authorities (Uecker 2009).
Third, bearing in mind that corruption corresponds to a private behavior that is difficult to be
controlled by authorities, cross-country studies show that the higher the proportion of Protestants
in a country’s population, the lower the perceived corruption (Herzfeld and Weiss 2003).
The aforementioned studies neither manipulated social control nor proposed any variable
explaining the differences between people from Protestant and Catholic backgrounds in terms of
moral-related behavior regulation. The present experiments aim at addressing these issues, using
a behavior that implies the violation of a strong moral norm, namely, cheating (see Cummins
1999). We focused on two specific forms of cheating, namely, copying off someone’s work (Study
1) and lying for self-gain (Study 2), which were both found to be perceived as particularly morally
unacceptable (Garavalia et al. 2007; Jensen et al. 2002). Surveys conducted over three decades
have consistently shown that religion (church) is seen as the second provider—after parents—of
rules that forbid cheating, including looking at someone else’s work during an exam, stealing
something, or lying (Schab 1991). More directly, a conception of God as a punishing figure,
and thus a controlling one, leads to less cheating (Shariff and Norenzayan 2011). We therefore
formulated a moderation hypothesis (tested in Studies 1 and 2) as well as a mediated moderation
one (tested in Study 2):
H1: Catholics should cheat less when social control is salient than when it is not, whereas
Protestants should be less—or even not—sensitive to social control;
H2: this interactive effect should be mediated by Catholics’ lower intrinsic (and/or higher
extrinsic) religiousness, compared to Protestants.
STUDY 1
Method
Participants
The ethics committee of the first author’s university gave approval for the experiments. Power
analysis showed that at least 50 participants were needed to detect a small-to-medium interaction
(d = .4) in a mixed within-between design with a power of .8 (Faul et al. 2009). Fifty-seven
individuals were recruited on a voluntary basis. We targeted a Swiss student housing historically
founded by friars to increase our chance to reach Christians. Participants were 17 Protestants, 30
Catholics, and three atheists. Five participants, categorizable neither as Protestant nor Catholic,
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as well as two others who guessed the aim of the experiment, were removed.2 Moreover, two
atheists were categorized according to the religious affiliation of their parents (the third atheist had
Buddhist parents). Results are essentially similar with or without these two participants. The final
sample included 18 Protestants and 31 Catholics (25 women, 24 men, MAge = 22.86, SD = 3.48).
Procedure
Before the experiment, two pilot studies were conducted to build the material and ensure it
would have the desired properties.
Pilot Study 1
Twenty participants, recruited in the first author’s university building, were asked to guess
more than 100 noncommon words, given a list of word hints. Out of the participants’ answers,
words were classified according to the following criteria: (i) easy words were those that at least
90 percent of participants guessed correctly; and (ii) difficult words were those that at least 90 per-
cent of participants could not guess. Ten easy words were randomly picked out of all words meet-
ing the first criteria and were used in the experiment (see Appendix A). All the words meeting the
second criteria—together with their corresponding hints—were retained and used in Pilot Study 2.
Pilot Study 2
Pilot Study 2’s goal was to select 10 difficult words for Study 1. Twenty other participants
(recruited in the same way) were given the hints for the difficult words selected in Pilot Study
1. For each hint, participants had to guess the correct word out of four given options, namely,
three semantically similar words and “I don’t know.” The latter option was added to prevent
participants from picking an answer randomly (which would have had artificially increased the
number of accurate matches). The 10 hints for which most participants guessed the correct word
were used in the experiment (see Appendix B). For these 10 hints, the rates of correct guesses
ranged from 50 percent to 90 percent. In sum, the selected difficult words were those that people
could not guess when given the definition, but that they could identify easily as being the correct
word when seeing it.
Main Study
Participants in Study 1 were told that the purpose of the research was to investigate verbal
intellectual capabilities. They believed that another individual participated at the same time in the
study. In fact, the other person was a trained accomplice.
The experiment consisted of two verbal tasks, both composed of a list of 10 hints. Each
list included five easy hints (selected from Pilot Study 1) and five difficult ones (selected from
Pilot Study 2), with easy hints relating to words that individuals guessed when provided with
their definition and difficult hints relating to words that they could only recognize as being the
correct answer when seeing them. Each participant saw the two lists (i.e., a within-participants
design). However, the lists were randomly counterbalanced between participants, and the hints
were randomized within lists. The easy and difficult hints were not labeled as such.
Both individuals—the participant and the accomplice—were seated next to each other on
two adjacent tables. A large opaque screen separated them up to 30 centimeters away from the
top end of the tables. Although this made it unfeasible for individuals to see each other (and, by
implication, the other’s answer sheet), it was possible for the participant to see the responses of
the accomplice if he/she moved the sheet to the top of the table.
The experimenter held a chronometer and told participants that they had eight minutes to
complete each task (48 seconds per word). This time limit was chosen because it seemed sufficient
2One Buddhist, one Hindu, two being both Catholic and Protestant, and one missing value.
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for participants to realize that, once having guessed the easy words, they would not be able to
guess the remaining difficult words (due to the level of difficulty). For each task, the accomplice
pushed forward his answer sheet to the top of the table after four minutes, therefore signaling that
he had finished the task. As alluded to above, at this point, the accomplice’s sheet was suddenly
visible to the participant. The accomplice always filled in all the correct answers on the sheet.
Social control manipulation was a within-participant variable. The manipulation was the
presence (vs. absence) of the authority during the task, that is, the experimenter. For half of
the participants (n = 23), the experimenter, feigning an important matter, left the room during
the first task, 30 seconds after the accomplice had pushed his answer sheet forward. Only two
participants realized that this event was staged and were therefore excluded from the analyses.
The experimenter came back 10 seconds before the end of the task to tell participants that the time
for the first task was up, and then stayed for the second one. For the other half of the participants
(n = 26), the order was reversed: the experimenter was present during the first task and absent
during the second one. It is worth noting that, while in the room, the experimenter spent his
time reading, looking through the window, or at his chronometer. He never looked directly at the
participants, in order to avoid a sense of direct surveillance. This way, hypothetically, cheating
without being caught was feasible even when the experimenter was present.
Variables
Cheating Behavior
From the pilot studies, difficult words are known to be almost impossible to guess, but easily
recognized when seen. Because participants could look at the answers of the accomplice, cheating
was measured by the number of difficult words correctly guessed reported on their own answer
sheet (M = 2.65, SD = 1.92). It is worth noting that the number of easy words found (M =
9.69, SD = .62) neither predicted the check measure in the present preliminary analyses nor was
predicted by social control and religion in the main analyses (ps  .32).
Self-Reported Check of Cheating Behaviors
At the end of the session, on a seven-point scale (1 = not at all and 7 = completely),
participants answered an item (“Have you tried to copy some of the other individual’s responses
in order to improve your score?”) that aimed at assessing the validity of our in-task cheating
measure (M = 2.27, SD = 1.72). Such self-reported measures of cheating have long been known
to be positively correlated with behavioral measures of cheating (Erickson and Smith 1974).
Results
Check of the Number of Difficult Words Solved as a Cheating Measure
In a linear regression model, the total number of difficult words guessed was found to be
positively associated with the self-reported check of cheating behavior, B = .35, 95% CI [.11, .59],
F(1, 47) = 8.70, p = .005, η²p = .15 percent.3 In other words, the more difficult words participants
guessed, the more they recognized having cheated. This confirmed the validity of our cheating
measure.
Overview of the Linear Regression Analyses
The experimental design is a 2 (social control: with vs. without) × 2 (religion: Protestants
vs. Catholics), with the former independent variable as a within-participant variable and the latter
3From here, “95% CI” is omitted and square brackets signal a 95 percent confidence interval; moreover, partial eta squared
corresponds to the effect size, that is, the proportion of variance specifically explained by the inclusion of the variable.
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Figure 1
Number of difficult words found (cheating behaviors; estimated means) as a function of
religious group (Protestants vs. Catholics) and condition (without vs. with social control)
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Note: Study 1. Error bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals.
as a between-participant variable. To test our predictions, we therefore regressed the difference
of difficult words found between the social control conditions on the religious background of the
participant (coded −.5 for Protestant and +.5 for Catholics). Note that the coefficient estimate
of the between-participant variable (religion) corresponds here to the interaction effect (the
difference between the conditions in terms of cheating, as a function of religion).
Complete Analyses of Covariance
Before running the main analysis, we conducted a complete analysis of covariance from the
aforementioned model (Yzerbyt, Muller, and Judd 2004) in order to determine the potential need
to control for additional variables, namely, sex, mean-centered age, the order of presentation of
the word lists, and that of the conditions (experimenter being first absent vs. present). Results
did not reveal any significant effects of these variables (Fs < 1). Therefore, these terms were not
further considered.
Effect of Religion and Social Control on Cheating Behaviors
Consistent with our expectation, analyses revealed an interaction between the religious group
and social control: B = −.80 [−1.58, −.02], F(1, 47) = 4.20, p = .046, η²p = .08. Specifically, as
expected and as seen in Figure 1, Catholics cheated more without social control (M = 1.94 [1.45,
2.42]) than with social control (M = 1.19 [.89, 1.50]), B = −.74, [−1.22, −.27], F(1, 47) =
9.92, p = .003, η²p = .17. Protestants, on the other hand, did not cheat more without social
control, M = .89, [.25, 1.53] than with social control, M = .94 [.54, 1.35], B = .06, [−.57, .68],
F < 1, n.s.
Discussion
In line with H1, social control (the presence vs. the absence of an authority) was found to
reduce cheating behaviors for Catholics, but not for Protestants.
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A second study was conducted using a larger sample from the U.S. general population,
which is much more diverse in terms of religious affiliation. Notably, atheists and agnostics from
Catholic and Protestant families took part in the study. Both a specific religious socialization and
a specific set of religious beliefs can convey the social norms regarding authority figures. In the
former case, H1 would hold true for such nonbelievers having been raised in a Christian family,
whereas in the latter, H1 would not hold true. A comparison between believers and nonbelievers
from Christian families may give information on that matter.
Moreover, we used a slightly different operationalization of social control. In Study 1, social
control was manipulated in an objective way (presence vs. absence of the authority). In Study 2,
it was manipulated in a subjective way (salience vs. nonsalience of social control), while keeping
constant the experimenter’s physical absence. As the perception of social control—rather than
the mere presence of an authority—should trigger Catholics’ regulation of cheating behaviors,
Study 1’s findings were expected to be replicated.
Finally, an important issue remained to be addressed, namely, that of the mediating variable(s)
of the observed interaction. Hence, Study 2 also aimed at testing the role of intrinsic-extrinsic
religiousness in accounting for the moderation between religion and social control on cheating,
that is, H2.
STUDY 2
Method
Participants
Power analysis showed that 200 participants were needed to detect a small-to-medium
interaction (d = .4) in a between-participants design with a power of .8. Given that about
30 percent of Americans do not identify themselves as Christian (Pew Research Center 2014),
we aimed at collecting at least 260 responses. Two hundred and seventy-seven Americans were
recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk. There were 82 Protestants, 45 Catholics, 15 from
an unspecified Christian faith (due to missing values), and 105 atheists. Thirty-five participants,
who could neither be categorized from a Protestant nor Catholic background, and two influential
observations (Cooks’ D > .1; Xie and Wei 2007) were excluded from analysis.4 As in Study 1,
when possible, atheists/agnostics were allocated to the religious affiliation of their parents (20
to Protestants and 28 to Catholics). The hypothesized interaction did not significantly differ as
a function of the participants being believers or not (cf. preliminary analyses). The final sample
comprised 102 participants from a Protestant background and 73 from a Catholic background
(105 women, and 70 men; MAge = 32.89, SD = 11.46).
Procedure
In exchange for a $0.40 payment, participants were invited to take part in an on-line study
allegedly on “performance under time pressure.” The task was adapted from Wiltermuth (2011).
Participants had up to five minutes to solve nine word jumbles. They were informed that there
was only one correct answer per jumble, and that they would receive a $0.10 payoff for each
word found. It was explained that the jumbles had to be solved in sequential order, so as to get
the bonus for each of them, and that jumping an unsolved jumble to unscramble the next one
would eliminate any potential bonus.
4Participants who could not be categorized were six Jews, three Buddhists, three from the Church of Christ, two Muslims,
two Orthodox Christians, one Hindu, one Mormon, and 17 missing values. However, in keeping with the two influential
observations, the hypothesized effect became marginal, IRR = .48 [.21, 1.12], z = −1.70, p = .090.
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Table 1: Word jumbles used in Study 2
Position Jumble Correct answer
Frequency of
correct
answers
Frequency of
answers reported
as correct
1 UNHTED HUNTED 96.57% 50.29%2 EOSHU HOUSE 92.57%
3 UNALGT n/a 0% 9.71%
4 YTHOIRD THYROID 41.71% 9.14%
5 OLARC CORAL/CAROL 68.00% 5.71%
6 JNIPMUG JUMPING 44.00% 4.57%
7 HGITWE WEIGHT 57.14% 6.29%
8 CLASLOU CALLOUS 46.29% 12.57%
9 YOMSEEVLD SEMOVEDLY .57% 1.71%
Next to each jumble, there was a text box where the solution could be reported. Table 1
presents the nine word jumbles. As in Wiltermuth (2011), the first two jumbles were easily
solvable (as a matter of fact, 90 percent of the participants reported correct answers to both), and
the third jumble was unsolvable. The last six jumbles were solvable, although the last one was
very difficult (i.e., “semovedly” is a rare synonym of “separately”). The fact that the five jumbles
following the unsolvable third jumble were feasible provided an incentive to cheat, that is, to act
as though one solved the third jumble. Unexpectedly, the average of jumbles solved was higher
than two (M = 4.34, SD = 2.06).5
Once the time had expired, participants reported the number of consecutive jumbles solved.
They were informed that they would receive the bonuses according to this report. To ensure the
participants clearly understood the instructions, they were all reminded that the jumbles should
be solved in the sequential order and that they should report “1” if they had solved the first
jumble, “2” if they had solved the first two, and so on. This information was repeated here for
the third time (i.e., in the general instructions, before the report, and during the report). Hence,
it was very unlikely that participants did not understand the rule at this point. As only the first
two jumbles were solvable, reporting more than two words was impossible without lying; thus,
the higher the self-reported number of jumbles solved above two, the greater the amount of
cheating.
The manipulation of the salience of social control was introduced with the question on the
report. For half of the participants, we asked the following question: “Please indicate how many
consecutive jumbles you have correctly unscrambled. You should know that the researcher might
verify the answers that you will be providing here” (salience of a possible social control, n =
77). For the other half, we only asked: “Please indicate how many consecutive jumbles you have
correctly unscrambled,” without any additional information (nonsalience of a possible social
control, n = 98).
5The third jumble being unsolvable, it was indeed unexpected that some participants did not follow the instructions and
tried to unscramble the further ones. There could be two reasons for this. On the one hand, given the time pressure created
by the cover story, it is possible that these participants aimed at coming back to the third jumble after having solved the
next ones (which could not be interpreted as an unequivocal nonobservance of the instructions). On the other hand, it is
equally possible that these participants voluntarily chose to disrespect the rule (which could be interpreted as cheating).
Hence, to avoid any alternative explanation of the measure, the number of jumbles actually solved was entered as a
covariate in preliminary analysis to ensure that the effect observed—if any—was indeed a matter of reporting a higher
number of jumbles than had been done, thus a matter of cheating.
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After having indicated their religion and answered a last series of questions, participants
were debriefed. They all received a payment as if they had solved the nine jumbles.
Variables
Cheating Behaviors
The self-reported number of word jumble(s) solved above two was used as the cheating
measure (M = 1.82, SD = 2.31). A value of “zero” meant no cheating. A large proportion of
participants were in that case (50.29 percent), showing a possible asymmetry in the distribution
(see the overview of the regression analyses). Since the third jumble was unsolvable, a value of
“one” indicated a dishonest report for a $.10 bonus. By extension, since the jumbles had to be
solved consecutively, a value of “two” suggested a two-fold dishonest report for a $.20 bonus, a
value of “three” a three-fold dishonest report for a $.30 bonus, and so on.
Relative Intrinsic-Extrinsic Religiousness
Participants answered Maltby and Lewis’s (1996) revised version of the I–E scale (1 = not
at all and 7 = completely). Eight items measured intrinsic religiousness (e.g., “I try to live all
my life according to my religious beliefs.”; α = .95, M = 3.33, SD = 1.92). Twelve others
measured extrinsic religiousness (e.g., “Sometimes I have to ignore my religious beliefs because
of what other people might think of me.”; α = .85, M = 2.85, SD = 1.17). As intrinsic and
extrinsic religiousness were highly correlated (r = .69, p < .001), we subtracted the latter from
the former (M = .49, SD = 1.40). Creating such a difference-based index is a common practice in
research on self-determination theory (e.g., self-concordance variable; Sheldon and Elliot 1999).
A positive value indicated a prioritized inclination toward intrinsic religiousness, a negative value
indicated a prioritized inclination toward extrinsic religiousness, and a value of zero indicated
similar inclinations toward intrinsic and extrinsic religiousness.
Self-Reported Indirect Admission of Cheating Behaviors
At the end of the survey, on a seven-point scale (1 = not at all and 7 = completely), participants
answered an item (“It is possible that I made a mistake while reporting my performance at the
task.”), indirectly checking that participants knew that their self-report number of the number of
jumbles solved was a lie (M = 3.47, SD = 2.27).
Results
A summary of the results is presented in Table 2.
Check of the Self-Reported Number of Jumbles Solved as a Cheating Measure
In a linear regression model, the self-reported number of word jumble(s) solved above two
was found to be positively associated with the propensity to admit to having possibly made a
mistake, B = .20, [.05, .34], F(1, 173) = 7.34, p = .007, η²p = .04. This confirmed the validity
of our cheating measure.
Overview of the Regression Analyses
Confirming the suspected asymmetry in distribution, the cheating behavior measure exhib-
ited a moderated right skewness (sk = .90) as well as quite a large peakness (k = 2.25). A
Shapiro-Wilk’s test—conducted on the residuals of a linear regression model—rejected the null
hypothesis (p > .06) of a normal distribution (Shapiro and Wilk 1965). With such a violation
of the normality assumption, and given the fact that the outcome variable’s mean and variance
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were in the same neighborhood, Poisson regressions were adapted (King 1988).6 The coefficient
estimate for Poisson regressions is expressed as an incidence rate ratio, such that IRR < 1 in-
dicates a negative effect, IRR > 1 indicates a positive effect, and IRR not significantly different
from 1 indicates a nonrejection of the null hypothesis. An IRR can also be read as an effect size
indicator (Faul et al. 2009). In this study, the self-reported number of jumbles solved (i.e., cheat-
ing behaviors) was regressed on the variables religious group (coded “−.5” for Protestant and
“+.5” for Catholics), social control (coded “−.5” for nonsalient and “+.5” for salient), and their
interaction.
Preliminary Analysis
Before running the main analysis, a complete analysis of covariance aimed at determining
the need to control for additional variables, namely, sex, mean-centered age, as well as the
fact that the participant reported being a believer or not (coded “−.5” for believers and “+.5”
for the nonbelievers being from a Christian family), and mean-centered task performance (see
Footnote 5). Analysis revealed main effects of all these variables except sex, as well as interaction
effects between performance and social control and/or religious group. Hence, these significant
terms were kept in the main analyses (see Table 2).
More fine-grained analysis revealed that the distinction between believers and nonbelievers
neither interacted with the condition nor with the religious group (Zs < 1). In line with Study 1’s
findings, simple effect analysis showed that the hypothesized interaction between social control
and religious group remained significant for participants who indicated being believers, B = .31
[.12, .85], z = −2.29, p = .022. The fact that the interaction held for the whole sample suggests
that socialization within a Catholic or a Protestant family matters more here than whether or not
a participant believed in God. Thus, the interaction terms involving this variable were not further
considered.
Effect of Religion and Social Control on Cheating Behaviors
A main effect of social control was found, IRR = .44 [.27, .71], z = −3.31, p < .001, as well
as a main effect of the religious group, IRR = .56 [.34, .91], Z = −2.34, p = .019. However, these
main effects were not necessarily meaningful given the presence of an interaction (see Figure 2).
Indeed, in line with H1, and replicating Study 1’s findings, the interaction between the
religious group and social control was significant, IRR = .35 [.13, .93], z = −2.10, p = .036.
Specifically, as seen in Figure 2, simple slope analysis revealed that Catholics cheated less when
social control was salient (M = .33 [.14, .75]), than when it was not (M = 1.26 [.90, 1.78]),
IRR = .26 [.11, .64], z = −2.96, p = .003. Such a difference was not observed for Protestants,
IRR = .74 [.50, 1.09], z = −1.54, p = .124.
Moreover, task performance was found to predict cheating, as well as to interact with our
variables of interest (see Table 2 for the details of the result). More precisely, the hypothesized
effect increased as actual performance decreased. It might simply result from a methodolog-
ical specificity of the task: for participants having unscrambled an elevated number of words
(especially after the third one), the self-reported number of jumbles solved reflects their actual
performance more than their cheating intentions. As there are fewer unsolved slots to report as
being solved, the room to cheat is mechanically reduced, limiting the discriminative power of the
cheating measure.
6To relax the equivariance assumption, negative binomial regression modeling could be used. In our case, the estimates
obtained from negative binomial regressions were descriptively similar to the estimates obtained from Poisson regressions
reported in the main text. Specifically, the difference between the incidence rate ratio of the hypothesized total effect from
the negative binomial model (IRR = .35, p = .092) and the incidence rate ratio of the hypothesized effect of the Poisson
regression model (IRR = .38, p = .036) was not significant, χ (1) < 1, p = .556.
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Figure 2
Self-reported number of word jumbles solved above Two (cheating behaviors; expected value)
as a function of religious group (Protestants vs. Catholics) and condition (nonsalience vs.
salience of social control)
0
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Note: Study 2. Error bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals.
Figure 3
Moderation effect between religion and social control on cheating behaviors, as mediated by
relative orientation toward intrinsic and extrinsic religiousness
** p < .001, * p < .05, † p = .1.
Mediated Moderation Analysis
Mediated moderation analyses were carried out to test whether the total interaction effect
between the religious group and social control on cheating (c path) could be explained by the
relative orientation toward intrinsic-extrinsic religiousness (see Figure 3).
As a first step, relative intrinsic-extrinsic religiousness was linearly regressed on the same
nine predictors as before. Analysis revealed an effect of the religious group, B = −.87 [−1.27,
−.48], F(1, 165) = 18.75, p < .001, η²p = .10 (a path), such that Protestants reported being more
oriented toward intrinsic than extrinsic religiousness (M = .62 [.34, .90]), whereas Catholics
showed the reversed tendency (M = −.25 [−.56, .05]).
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As a second step, we ran the same Poisson regression analysis as conducted earlier (using
cheating as the dependent variable), and added mean-centered relative intrinsic-extrinsic reli-
giousness and its interaction with social control as predictors. The effect of social control was
moderated by relative intrinsic-extrinsic religiousness, IRR = 1.21 [1.01, 1.44], z = 2.05, p = .040
(b path). Salience of social control predicted less cheating when participants were intrinsically
oriented (−1 SD), IRR = .31 [.17, .57], z = −3.85, p < .001, than when they were extrinsically
oriented (+1 SD), IRR = .53 [.31, .90], z = −2.35, p = .019. The interaction between the
religious group and social control became marginal, IRR = .43 [.16, 1.16], z = −1.67, p = .095
(c path).
The calculation of the conditional indirect effect is not as straightforward for count outcome
variables as it is for linear outcome variables (see Hayes 2013). We calculated it using medflex,
an R package relying on the counterfactual mediation framework (Steen et al. 2017). The social
control manipulation was found to be indirectly more associated with cheating through an increase
in extrinsic (vs. intrinsic) religiousness for Catholics than for Protestants, albeit the effect fell
short of significance, IRR = .76 [.57, 1.01], z = −1.88, p = .060.
Discussion
In line with H1 and replicating Study 1’s findings with a different paradigm, in Study 2, social
control was found to reduce cheating behavior among individuals from a Catholic background,
but not among those from a Protestant background.
Interestingly, no difference was found between believers and nonbelievers, which suggests
that the effect may be due to religious upbringing rather than religious belief in and of itself.
This would be consistent with the idea that family religion is an important factor determining
the transgenerational transmission of values (Hoge, Petrillo, and Smith 1982). Specifically, being
raised in a Catholic family (and, by extension, in its related social network) shapes specific
values, such as respect for authority and norm compliance, whereas being raised in a Protestant
family encourages intellectual autonomy and self-reliance (Ellison and Sherkat 1993). Such
socialization processes might explain why social control is more effective for individuals from a
Catholic background, regardless of their personal religious conviction. However, as this reasoning
is based on a null result (an absence of difference between believers and nonbelievers), further
studies are needed before a definitive conclusion can be drawn.
Moreover, in line with H2, orientation toward intrinsic-extrinsic religiousness was found to
mediate this moderation effect. Simply put, a lower relative orientation toward intrinsic religiosity
accounted for Catholics’ higher sensitivity to the effect of social control on cheating. However,
the conditional, indirect effect fell short of significance. Thus, Study 2’s mediation result has to
be considered carefully. It offers suggestive (rather than conclusive) evidence in support of the
full mediated moderation model that needs to be replicated.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Some essential differences between Study 1 and Study 2 should be highlighted. First, social
control was operationalized via the actual presence of authority in Study 1, whereas Study 2
contained only an implied element of social control. The similarity of findings between the two
studies speaks in favor of the psychological nature of the phenomenon. The mere impression
of social control is most likely what directs Catholics (vs. Protestants) toward endorsing more
desirable moral behaviors.
Second, Protestants were found to cheat less than Catholics in Study 1, whereas the reverse
was true in Study 2. This illustrates that Protestants and Catholics do not differ per se in terms
of cheating inclination, with the latter cheating more than the former (or vice-versa). More
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specifically, Protestants—given their orientation toward intrinsic (vs. extrinsic) religiousness—
appraise moral-related behaviors independently of their perception of social control, which may
alternatively lead to more or less cheating behavior. For Protestants, the context-invariant level of
cheating might depend on the nature of the norm violation (copying off someone’s work in Study
1, versus lying for self-gain in Study 2) (see Garavalia et al. 2007), or the achievement context
(low-stake test in Study 1, versus cash incentive in Study 2) (see Weber [1992] 1992). Regardless
of the reasons, these findings suggest that behavior regulation is grounded in an internal source
of control (the self) for Protestants, and in an external source of control (the monitoring of an
authority) for Catholics. This is consistent with research on objective self-awareness, showing
that self-focused individuals tend to act more consistently and are less likely to be moral
hypocrites (for a review, see Silvia and Duval 2001).
Limitations
Three limitations should be acknowledged. First, a word of caution with respect to the
extension of the findings to all existing Catholic/Protestant subgroups should be added. Given
our theoretical framework, it is indeed conceivable that some isolated and specific groups of
Protestants could exhibit behaviors at odds with the results of the present studies. For instance,
small and cohesive Protestant groups could be more responsive to social control than those in our
samples, to the extent that their church is organized in a hierarchical and authoritarian way.
Second, one may argue that our manipulations affected the appraisal of the likelihood of
being caught cheating. However, one’s perceptions of the risk of being caught and sanctioned
are a key determinant of the level of perceived social control (for an illustration with juvenile
delinquency, see Kaplan, Gostjev, and Johnson 2013). Thus, it is likely that Catholics might have
assessed such a risk as being greater in the social control condition, regulating their behaviors
accordingly. This is particularly true in Study 1: the physical presence of the experimenter might
have increased the risk of being caught (despite the fact that he pretended to be busy with other
matters). Interestingly, there are some hints in the literature suggesting that Catholics are more
sensitive to risk (e.g., gun-related risks of incidents; Kahan et al. 2007), and future research might
investigate whether risk sensitivity contributes to explaining why Catholics are more responsive
to social control.
Third, one might have concerns regarding the validity of the cheating measure used in
Study 2, that is, the self-reported number of jumbles solved above two. As most participants
unscrambled the jumbles following the unsolvable third jumble, one cannot formally exclude that
they misunderstood the instructions and reported the raw (rather than the consecutive) number
of jumbles solved. In such, the cheating measure would be ambiguous. Yet, three counter-
arguments can be presented. First, Study 2’s jumble task was used in previous research, in which
the overreport of the performance was taken as a behavioral measure of cheating (e.g., Gino
and Mogilner 2014: Hoffmann et al. 2015; Wiltermuth 2011). Second, in our experiment, the
self-reported number of jumbles solved above two was associated with an indirect propensity to
admit having possibly lied, speaking in favor of the validity of the measure (see Erickson and
Smith 1974). Third, the hypothesized interaction observed in Study 1 with a more unequivocal
measure of cheating (copying off someone’s work) was the same as the interaction observed in
Study 2 (i.e., Catholics being more responsive to social control), providing extra support to the
idea that Study 2’s outcome variable is indeed a cheating measure.
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
This work raises doubts as to the unconditional effectiveness of public policies based on
social control. As is often the case, ensuring compliance to norms requires some control from
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the authorities. In school, policies based on cheating detection algorithms (notably based on test
score fluctuations) were developed to reduce the prevalence of academic dishonesty (Jacob and
Levitt 2003). Beyond the issue of education, other examples include the use of road checkpoint
and radar in preventing car accidents (Asbridge, Smart, and Mann 2006), security cameras
in reducing misconduct (van Rompay, Vonk, and Fransen 2009), and even mass surveillance
electronic technology in preventing crime or terrorism (Ogura 2006). Such instruments of social
control can be linked to Bentham’s Panopticon, a prison in which convicts know that they could
be observed but do not know whether they are currently observed or not. Foucault (1975) used the
Panopticon metaphor to describe a disciplinary system based on social control. Given our results,
one might query whether concrete Panopticon-like surveillance systems might have any deterrent
effect within certain groups, such as Protestants or individuals from a Protestant background. The
same reasoning could be extended to other social groups not regulating their self-presentation
with regard to social norms (Berinsky 2004), or to societies having weak social norms and an
elevated tolerance of deviant behavior (i.e., the so-called loose societies; see Gelfand et al. 2011;
Triandis 1989).
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